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Abstract
We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic problem of fair
cake-cutting — dividing a heterogeneous resource among agents with different
preferences. Resource- and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where
the cake, or the number of participants who divide the cake, changes. It is
required that the utility of all participants change in the same direction: either
all of them are better-off (if there is more to share or fewer to share among) or
all are worse-off (if there is less to share or more to share among).
We formally introduce these concepts to the cake-cutting problem and ex-
amine whether they are satisfied by various common division rules. We prove
that the Nash-optimal rule, which maximizes the product of utilities, is resource-
monotonic and population-monotonic, in addition to being Pareto-optimal, envy-
free and satisfying a strong competitive-equilibrium condition. Moreover, we
prove that it is the only rule among a natural family of welfare-maximizing
rules that is both proportional and resource-monotonic.
Keywords: game theory, cake-cutting, resource-monotonicity,
population-monotonicity, additive utilities
1. Introduction
The interest in monotonicity axioms was motivated by paradoxes such as
the throw-away paradox (Aumann and Peleg, 1974): in some cases an agent can
improve his final utility by discarding some goods from the initial endowment.
Such apparent paradoxes occur in real life too. Farmers may want to burn crops
in order to increase their market-price. In traffic networks, it may be possible
to decrease the time spent on traffic-jams by removing a bridge (this is the
so-called Breass Paradox, Braess (1968)). In all these cases, some agents are
worse-off when the social endowment is larger. Such agents have an incentive to
destroy some of the endowment, or at least prevent growth, in order to improve
their well-being.
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These issues motivated the axiom of resource-monotonicity (RM).1 It re-
quires that when new resources are added, and the same division rule is used
consistently, the utility of all agents should weakly increase. A related axiom
is population-monotonicity (PM). It is concerned with changes in the number
of participants. It requires that when a new agent joins the process, all exist-
ing participants have to make sacrifices in order to support the new agent, thus
their utility weakly decreases. Both properties have inverse versions — when the
cake becomes smaller every utility should weakly decrease (RM), when someone
leaves the division process every utility should weakly increase (PM).
The present paper studies these two monotonicity requirements in the frame-
work of the classic fair cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), where a single
heterogeneous resource — such as land or time — has to be divided fairly. Fair
cake-cutting protocols can be applied in inheritance cases and divorce settle-
ments. They can be also used to divide broadcast time of advertisements and
priority access time for customers of an Internet service provider (Caragiannis
et al., 2011).
The notion of fairness in cake-cutting is commonly restricted to two proper-
ties: proportionality means that each of the n agents should receive a value of
at least 1/n of the total cake value; envy-freeness means that each agent weakly
prefers his share over the share of any other agent. Monotonicity axioms have
not been adapted so far for the cake-cutting literature. Indeed, they are vio-
lated by all classic fair-cake-cutting procedures that we checked. For example,
the classic cut-and-choose protocol is proportional but not resource-monotonic2
(Section 3.3). It is easy to find monotonic rules that are not proportional (e.g.
the rule that gives the entire cake to a pre-specified agent). Our goal in this
paper is to find division rules that satisfy all fairness axioms simultaneously.
Initially (Section 4) we focus on two natural families of welfare-maximizing
rules — rules that maximize the sum of an increasing function of the absolute
or relative values of the agents. These families include, as special cases, the
utilitarian rule (maximizing the sum of utilities) and the Nash-optimal rule
(maximizing the sum of log of utilities). We prove necessary and sufficient
conditions for such rules to be essentially-single-valued (ESV) — recommend a
unique utility-profile — as well as for monotonicity and proportionality. Based
on these conditions, we prove that the Nash-optimal rule is the only rule in these
families that is essentially-single-valued, resource-monotonic and proportional.
Moreover, this rule is also population-monotonic and envy-free. This solves an
open question posed by Berliant et al. (1992)3.
1 Resource-monotonicity was introduced by Moulin and Thomson (1988). It is also common
in cooperative game theory, where it is called aggregate monotonicity (Peleg and Sudhölter,
2007).
2In an accompanying technical report (Segal-Halevi and Sziklai, 2015) we provide similar
examples showing that other classic cake-cutting procedures, like Banach-Knaster, Dubins-
Spanier and many others, violate both RM and PM.
3"...there are a number of important issues that should be tackled next pertaining, in
particular, to the existence of selections from the no-envy solution satisfying additional prop-
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Then (Section 5) we focus on another family of rules, related to the famous
rule of competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). This rule is known
to be envy-free and Pareto-optimal in other domains, and Weller (1985) proved
that it exists in cake-cutting too. However, we prove that a CEEI by Weller’s
definition (which we call WCEEI) is not Pareto-optimal and not ESV. A stronger
variant of this definition, which we call PCEEI, is Pareto-optimal, but still not
ESV. We present an even stronger variant, which we call SCEEI, and prove that
is Pareto-optimal and ESV, as well as RM, PM, envy-free and proportional.
Moreover, we prove that SCEEI is in fact identical to the Nash-optimal rule,
and note that this equivalence does not hold for its weaker variants.
Finally (Section 6), we study a third family of rules, based on the leximin
principle (maximizing the smallest value, then the next-smallest value, etc.) We
study two rules in this family: one based on absolute values and the other on
relative values. We show that the absolute-leximin rule is RM but not propor-
tional, while the relative-leximin rule is proportional but not RM.
Our work shows that the Nash-optimal rule is ideal for fair cake cutting.
Other works, published independently and contemporaneously to our work,
prove other desirable properties of the Nash-optimal-CEEI rule for indivisible
item assignment (Caragiannis et al., 2016), public decision making (Conitzer
et al., 2017) and homogeneous resource allocation (Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2016). The combined evidence of the these works shows that the Nash-optimal
rule may be the most fair allocation rule in various settings.
2. Related Work
The cake-cutting problem originates from the work of the Polish mathemati-
cian Hugo Steinhaus and his students Banach and Knaster (Steinhaus, 1948).
Their primary concern was how to divide the cake in a fair way. Since then,
game theorists analyzed the strategic issues related to cake-cutting, while com-
puter scientists were focusing mainly on how to compute solutions efficiently.
See Brânzei (2015); Procaccia (2016) for recent reviews.
Monotonicity issues have been extensively studied with respect to cooper-
ative game theory (Calleja et al., 2012), political representation (Balinski and
Young, 1982), computer resource allocation (Ghodsi et al., 2011), single-peaked
preferences (Sönmez, 1994) and other fair division problems. Extensive reviews
of monotonicity axioms can be found in chapters 3, 6 and 7 of (Moulin, 2004)
and in chapter 7 of Thomson (2011). To the best of our knowledge, the present
paper is the first that studies these properties in a cake-cutting setting.
Experimental studies show that people value certain fairness criteria more
than others. Herreiner and Puppe (2009) demonstrated that people are will-
ing to sacrifice Pareto-efficiency in order to reach an envy-free allocation. To
erties, Examples are monotonicity with respect to the amount to be divided (all agents should
benefit from such an increase), and with respect to changes in the number of claimants (all
agents initially present should lose in such circumstances)." (Berliant et al., 1992)
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our knowledge no study was ever conducted to unfold the relationship between
monotonicity and efficiency or proportionality. However some indirect evidence
points toward that monotonicity of the solution is in some cases as impor-
tant as proportionality. The so called apportionment problem, where electoral
seats have to be distributed among administrative regions provides the most
notorious examples. The seat distribution of the US House of Representatives
generated many monotonicity related anomalies in the last two centuries. The
famous Alabama-paradox, as well as the later discovered population and new
state paradoxes pressed the legislators to adopt newer and newer apportionment
rules. The currently used seat distribution method is free from such anomalies,
however it does not satisfy the so called Hare-quota, a basic guarantee of pro-
portionality (Kóczy et al., 2017). We view this as an evidence that monotonicity
is as important fairness axiom as the classic axioms of proportionality and envy-
freeness.
Thomson (1997) defines the replacement principle, which requires that, when-
ever any change happens in the environment, the welfare of all agents not re-
sponsible for the change should be affected in the same direction — they should
all be made at least as well off as they were initially or they should all be made at
most as well off. This is the most general way of expressing the idea of solidarity
among agents. The PM and RM axioms are special cases of this principle.
The consistency axiom (Young, 1987; Thomson, 2012) resembles population-
monotonicity since in both axioms the set of agents changes. However it is
fundamentally different as it assumes that leaving agents take their fair shares
with them.
Arzi (2012); Arzi et al. (2016) study the "dumping paradox" in cake-cutting.
They show that, in some cakes, discarding a part of the cake improves the total
social welfare of any envy-free division. This implies that enlarging the cake
might decrease the total social welfare. This is related to resource-monotonicity;
the difference is that in our case we are interested in the welfare of the individual
agents and not in the total social welfare.
Chambers (2005) studies a related cake-cutting axiom called "division in-
dependence": if the cake is divided into sub-plots and each sub-plot is divided
according to a rule, then the outcome should be identical to dividing the original
cake using the same rule. He proves that the only rule which satisfies Pareto-
optimality and division independence is the utilitarian-optimal rule — the rule
which maximizes the sum of the agents’ utilities. Unfortunately, this rule does
not satisfy the fairness axioms of proportionality and envy-freeness.
Walsh (2011) studies the problem of "online cake-cutting", in which agents
arrive and depart during the process of dividing the cake. He shows how to
adapt classic procedures like cut-and-choose and the Dubins-Spanier in order to
satisfy online variants of the fairness axioms. Monotonicity properties are not
studied, although the problem is similar in spirit to the concept of population-
monotonicity. Kash et al. (2014) also study a dynamic resource allocation set-
ting, but they deal with multiple, homogeneous, divisible resources. The authors
assume that participants are added sequentially, but resources allocated to ex-
isting participants cannot be taken back, which can be viewed as a stronger
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form of resource monotonicity. Segal-Halevi (2016) studies a related problem of
how to re-divide a cake when new agents join the scene, while balancing fairness
for the new agents with the ownership rights of the old agents.
3. Model
3.1. Cake-cutting
A cake-cutting problem is a triple Γ(N,C, (v̂i)i∈N ) where:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents who participate in the cake-
cutting process. In examples with a small number of agents, we often refer
to them by names (Alice, Bob, Carl...).
• C is the cake. We assume that C is an interval, C = [0, c] for some real
number c.
• v̂i is the value measure of agent i. It is a non-negative real-valued function
defined on the Borel subsets of [0,∞). We assume that the value of every
finite interval is finite. As the term “measure” implies, v̂i is countably
additive: the value measures of a countable union of disjoint subsets is
the sum of the values of the subsets.
We call a Borel subset of C a slice. A slice with a positive value for at least
one agent is called a positive slice. A slice allotted to an agent is called a piece.
We assume that the value measures are nonatomic. This means that any
point on the interval is worth 0 for all agents4. We also assume that each agent
values the entire cake as positive. All these assumptions are standard in the
cake-cutting literature.
Our model diverges from the standard cake-cutting setup in that we do not
require the value measures to be normalized. That is, the value of the entire cake
is not necessarily the same for all agents. This is important because we examine
scenarios where the cake changes, so the cake value might become larger or
smaller. Hence, we differentiate between absolute and relative value measures:
• The absolute value measure of the entire cake, v̂i(C), can be any positive
value and it can be different for different agents.
• The relative value of the entire cake is 1 for all agents. Relative value
measures are denoted by vi and defined by: vi(X) := v̂i(X)/v̂i(C).
4 It is sometimes assumed that the value-measures are absolutely-continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure. This means that any slice with zero length has zero value for everyone.
This is equivalent to the assumption that each value-measure is the integral of some “value-
density” function, describing the value per unit of length. The absolute-continuity assumption
is strictly stronger than our non-atomicity assumption; see Hill and Morrison (2010) and
Schilling and Stoyan (2016).
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It is also common to assume that value measures are private information of
the agents. This question leads us to whether agents are honest about their
preferences. While cake-cutting problems can be studied from a strategic angle
(Brânzei et al., 2016), here we will not analyze the strategic behavior of the
agents and assume that their valuations are known.
A division is a partition of the cake into n pairwise-disjoint pieces, X =
(X1, . . . , Xn), such that X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xn = C.
A division rule is a correspondence that takes a cake-cutting problem as
input and returns a division or a set of divisions.
A division rule R is called essentially single-valued (ESV) if X,Y ∈ R(Γ)
implies that for all i ∈ N , v̂i(Xi) = v̂i(Yi). That is, even if R returns a set of
divisions, all agents are indifferent between these divisions.
The classic requirements of fair cake-cutting are the following. A division X
is called:
• Pareto-optimal (PO) if there is no other division which is weakly better
for all agents and strictly better for at least one agent.
• Proportional (PROP) if each agent gets at least 1/n fraction of the cake
according to his own evaluation, i.e. for all i ∈ N , vi(Xi) ≥ 1/n. Note
that the definition uses relative values.
• Envy-free (EF) if each agent gets a piece which is weakly better, for that
agent, than all the other agents’ pieces: for all i, j ∈ N , vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj).
Note that here it is irrelevant whether absolute or relative values are used.
Note that, since the entire cake is divided, EF implies PROP.
A division rule is called Pareto-optimal (PO) if it returns only PO divisions.
The same applies to proportionality and envy-freeness.
3.2. Monotonicity
We now define the two monotonicity properties. In the introduction we
defined them informally for the special case in which the division rule returns
a single division. Our formal definition is more general and applicable to rules
that may return a set of divisions.
The first two definitions relate to resource-monotonicity (RM).
Definition 3.1. Let N be a fixed set of agents, C = [0, c], C ′ = [0, c′] two cakes
where c < c′, and (v̂i)i∈N value measures on [0,∞). Then the cake-cutting prob-
lem Γ′ = (N,C ′, (v̂i)i∈N ) is called a cake-enlargement of Γ = (N,C, (v̂i)i∈N ).
The set of cake-enlargements of Γ is denoted CakeEnlargements(Γ).
We enlarge the cake from the right-hand side for practical reasons, but this
fact does not have any significance from a theoretical point of view (the theorems
are valid no matter where the enlargement is placed).
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Definition 3.2. A division rule R is called:
(a) Upwards RM — if for every Γ, every Γ′ ∈ CakeEnlargements(Γ) and
every division X ∈ R(Γ) there exists a division Y ∈ R(Γ′) such that v̂i(Yi) ≥
v̂i(Xi) for all i ∈ N (all agents are weakly better-off when the cake is larger).
(b) Downwards RM — if for every Γ, every Γ′ ∈ CakeEnlargements(Γ)
and every Y ∈ R(Γ′) there exists a division X ∈ R(Γ) such that v̂i(Xi) ≤ v̂i(Yi)
for all i ∈ N (all agents are weakly worse-off when the cake is smaller).
(c) A division rule is RM if it is both upwards RM and downwards RM.
The next two definitions relate to population-monotonicity (PM).
Definition 3.3. Let C be a fixed cake, N and N ′ two sets of agents such
that N ⊃ N ′ and (v̂i)i∈N their value measures. Then the cake-cutting problem
Γ′ = (N ′, C, (v̂i)i∈N ′) is called a population-reduction of Γ = (N,C, (v̂i)i∈N ).
The set of population-reductions of Γ is denoted PopReductions(Γ).
Definition 3.4. A division rule R is called:
(a) Upwards PM, if for every Γ, every Γ′ ∈ PopReductions(Γ) and every
division Y ∈ R(Γ′), there exists a division X ∈ R(Γ) such that v̂i(Xi) ≤ v̂i(Yi)
for all i ∈ N ′ (all agents who participate in both divisions are weakly worse-off
when a new agent joins the process).
(b) Downwards PM, if for every Γ, every Γ′ ∈ PopReductions(Γ) and every
division X ∈ R(Γ), there exists a division Y ∈ R(Γ′) such that v̂i(Yi) ≥ v̂i(Xi)
for all i ∈ N ′ (all agents who participate in both divisions are weakly better-off
if someone leaves).
(c) A division rule is population-monotonic (PM), if it is both upwards and
downwards population-monotonic.
Remark 3.5. As usual in the literature, the monotonicity axioms care only
about absolute values. It is not considered a violation of RM if the relative
value of an agent decreases when the cake grows.
Remark 3.6. For essentially-single-valued solutions, downwards resource (or
population) monotonicity implies upwards resource (or population) monotonic-
ity and vice versa. Set-valued solutions, however, may satisfy only one direction
of these axioms.
Remark 3.7. The monotonicity axioms in Thomson (2011) require that all
divisions in R(Γ) should be weakly better/worse than all divisions in R(Γ′). In
contrast, our definition, which originates from cooperative game theory (Peleg
and Sudhölter, 2007), only requires that there exists such a division. Clearly, our
monotonicity condition is weaker and it is implied by Thomson’s monotonicity.
The rationale behind the weaker definition is that even if a set-valued solution
is used, only a single allocation will be implemented. Hence, the divider can
be faithful to the monotonicity principles even if the rule suggests many non-
monotonic allocations as well. However, the “protagonist” of the present paper
— the Nash-optimal rule — is essentially-single-valued (Corollary 4.11); for such
rules, the two definitions coincide.
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3.3. Examples
In our first example we show that Cut and Choose, the most widely applied
division method, is not resource monotonic. Suppose Alice and Bob want to
divide a one-dimensional land-plot, e.g. a river-bank, that is modeled by the
cake C1 = [0, 5]. Alice’s valuation of the land increases the more eastwards we
go. Her valuation is given by (upper curves in Figure 1):
v̂A([0, x]) = x
2 + 7x,
dvˆA([0, x])
dx
= 2x+ 7.
Bob likes the lands adjacent to x = 7/2. His valuation is given by (lower curves
in Figure 1):
v̂B([0, x]) = 3 arctan (4x− 14) + 3 arctan(14), dvˆB([0, x])
dx
=
12
16
(
x− 72
)2
+ 1
.
They play Cut and Choose: Alice cuts the cake into two pieces, Bob chooses
the piece most valuable for him and Alice keeps the other one. Figure 1 illus-
trates the process. On the right hand side, the function v̂([0, x]) represents the
cumulative utility of the agents, i.e. the value of the piece that lies left to the
point x ∈ R. On the left hand side, we plotted the derivative of this function,
which can be interpreted as a “value density”.
Alice cuts C1 at 3, as the pieces [0, 3] and [3, 5] worth the same for her. It is
clear from the figure that the most valuable part of the cake for Bob lies right
to the cut point, from which Bob obtains a utility of
∫ 5
3
12
16(x− 72 )
2
+1
dµ ≈ 7.53.
Now, new lands become available to the east of the existing lands, so the
cake is now C2 = [0, 6]. Alice cuts C2 around 3.65 and Bob is forced to choose
between the pieces [0, 3.65] and [3.65, 6]. Since
∫ 3.65
0
12
16(x− 72 )
2
+1
dµ ≈ 6.11 and∫ 6
3.65
12
16(x− 72 )
2
+1
dµ ≈ 2.79 Bob loses utility no matter which one he chooses.
This simple counterexample implies that the Banach-Knaster and the Fink
methods are not resource-monotonic either, since they both produce the same
division on the above cake as Cut and Choose5. It is an easy exercise to show
that Bob loses utility with the Dubins-Spanier or the Even-Paz methods as well.
Remark 3.8. Sziklai and Segal-Halevi (2015) show that the Banach-Knaster,
Cut and Choose, Dubins-Spanier, Even-Paz, Fink, and Selfridge-Conway meth-
ods are neither RM nor PM. Some of these methods can be made monotonic
by using a special ordering: the Fink method is upwards-PM if the new agent
is the last who chooses slices; the Cut and Choose protocol is RM if the agents
are ordered by their cut marks and the one who has the rightmost cut mark
cuts the cake 6 .
5A more recent protocol, the Recursive Cut and Choose, proposed by Tasnádi (2003),
violates resource-monotonicity for the same reason.
6this variant is called the Rightmost Mark rule (Sziklai and Segal-Halevi, 2015).
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dvˆ([0,x])
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Figure 1: Cut and Choose is not RM.
The rest of the paper will feature piecewise homogeneous cakes. A piecewise-
homogeneous cake is a finite union of disjoint intervals, such that inside each
interval Ij , every agent i values each subset Z ⊆ Ij as (ai,Ij · length(Z)),
where the ai,Ij values are constants. In such cases, the cumulative utility of
the agents, v̂([0, x]) is a piecewise-linear function (see Figure 2). Although
piecewise-homogeneous cakes lack a certain cake cutting flavour, their simplic-
ity makes them ideal for illustration purposes. We stress that our theorems hold
for arbitrary cakes — not only for piecewise-homogeneous ones.
Piecewise homogeneous cakes can be represented by a table containing the
values of the agents on the different intervals. For example the cake in Figure 2
can be presented as follows (note that each interval has a length of 1):
v̂A 6 0 4 0 1 1
v̂B 2 2 0 3 3 0
Throughout the paper the H sign over a column indicates the enlargement.
4. Welfare-Maximizing Rules
In this section we search for division rules satisfying the desired properties of
PROP, EF, RM, PM and PO. Since Pareto-optimality is a basic requirement, we
confine our search to two families of division-rules that are PO by design — the
families of welfare maximizing rules. A welfare-maximizing rule is parametrized
by a strictly increasing function w : R+ → R ∪ {−∞,+∞}. We limit our
attention to welfare functions that are twice continuously differentiable. We
also assume that w is independent of n; such consistency requirement is natural
when investigating rules defined over varying population or resource sizes.
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cake0 6
dvˆ([0,x])
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vˆB([0, x])
vˆA([0, x])
Figure 2: Piecewise homogeneous cake with two players. Note that the value measures are
not normalized, hence v̂A([0, 6]) 6= v̂B([0, 6]).
Given a function w, it is possible to define two different social welfare max-
imizers:
• The relative-w-maximizer rule selects all allocations that maximize the
relative-welfare function Ww(X) :=
∑n
i=1 w(vi(Xi));
• The absolute-w-maximizer rule selects allocations that maximize the absolute-
welfare function Ŵw(X) :=
∑n
i=1 w(v̂i(Xi)).
Such social-welfare functions satisfy several reasonable axioms (Moulin, 2004,
pages 66-69). The following lemma shows that these rules are well-defined.
Lemma 4.1. For every continuous function w, there exists an allocation that
maximizes Ww and an allocation that maximizes Ŵw.
Proof. For every allocationX, letM(X) be its relative-value-matrix — a matrix
M where ∀i, j : Mi,j = vi(Xj). Let M the set of all matrices that correspond to
allocations of the cake:
M := {M(X)|X is a cake-allocation}
Theorem 1 of Dubins and Spanier (1961), which is a special case of a theorem
of Dvoretzky et al. (1951), implies that, if all value-measures are non-atomic
(as we assume throughout the paper), then M is a compact and convex set of
matrices. By compactness, for each continuous function there exists a matrix
M ∈M that maximizes it. This is true in particular for the continuous function
Uw(M) :=
∑n
i=1 w(Mi,i). Every matrixM ∈M that maximizes Uw is a relative-
value-matrix of an allocation X that maximizes Ww.
An analogous proof applies to Ŵw.
Since w is strictly increasing, the absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer
rules are trivially Pareto-optimal.
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Probably the most famous rules in the family of welfare-maximizers are the
utilitarian rules, maximizing the sum of values. They are attained when w is
the identity function, w(v) = v.
As we will see in this section, the properties of welfare-maximizing rules
crucially depend on the level of concavity of the function w. Specifically, we
will be interested in whether w is convex (w′(x) is increasing) or concave (w′(x)
is decreasing). Additionally, we are interested in the following sub-class of the
strictly concave functions:
Definition 4.2. A differentiable function w is hyper-concave if xw′(x) is de-
creasing.
Note that for strictly increasing functions hyper-concavity implies strict-
concavity, but the opposite is not true7.
In the following subsections we will examine the properties of rules from the
two welfare-maximizer families. We will prove that:
• Both absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer rules are essentially-
single-valued whenever w is strictly-concave.
• The absolute-w-maximizer rules are resource-monotonic whenever w is
concave.
• The relative-w-maximizer rules are proportional whenever w is hyper-
concave.
The link between concavity and proportionality is not surprising. Intuitively,
if w is strictly concave, then giving an additional unit of utility to an agent
produces less and less social welfare as the agent’s utility increases. For instance
if we divide a cake among two agents, and there is a small slice that is worth
approximately the same for the two agents, then a strictly concave w-maximizer
will give that slice to the ’poorer’ agent, while a strictly convex w-maximizer
will give it to the ’richer’ agent.
The link between concavity and resource-monotonicity seems more surprising
at first. The proof of Theorem 4.5 provides some intuition about this relation-
ship.
4.1. Essentially-single-valuedness
In this section we prove that strict concavity of w is a sufficient and “almost”
necessary condition for w-maximizer rules being essentially-single-valued.
Theorem 4.3. (a) If w is strictly-concave, then both the absolute-w-maximizer
and the relative-w-maximizer are ESV.
(b) If w is not strictly-concave, then the absolute-w-maximizer is not ESV.
(c) If w is not strictly-concave in [0, 1], and the relative-w-maximizer is
proportional, then the relative-w-maximizer is not ESV.
7For example: w(x) =
√
x is strictly concave but not hyper-concave.
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Proof of Theorem 4.3(a). Suppose w is strictly-concave. Define M as in the
proof of Lemma 4.1; as mentioned there,M is a compact and convex set of matri-
ces. By convexity, every strictly-concave function is maximized by a single ma-
trix M ∈M. This is particularly true for the function Uw(M) :=
∑n
i=1 w(Mi,i),
which is strictly-concave since w is. Let M∗ be the unique matrix in M that
maximizes Uw. Then, in every allocation that maximizesWw, the relative-value-
matrix is M∗. Hence the relative-w-maximizer is ESV.
An analogous proof applies to Ŵw and the absolute-w-maximizer.
The proofs of parts (b) and (c) require the following technical lemma:
Lemma 4.4. Let w be a twice-continuously-differentiable function.
1. If w is not strictly-concave in some interval [a, b] with a < b, then w is
convex in some sub-interval [s, t] with a ≤ s < t ≤ b.
2. If w is not concave in some interval [a, b] with a < b, then w is strictly-
convex in some sub-interval [s, t] with a ≤ s < t ≤ b.
Proof. See Appendix.
The maximum of a convex function in an interval is attained in an endpoint
of the interval. Hence, when w is convex in [s, t], we can create scenarios where
the welfare functions are maximized both when the utility-vector is s, t and
when it is t, s.
Proof of Theorem 4.3(b). Suppose w is not strictly-concave and let [s, t] be an
interval in which it is convex, with s < t. Consider the following cake:
v̂A s 0 t− s
v̂B 0 s t− s
By Pareto-optimality, slice #1 goes to Alice and slice #2 goes to Bob. Let x be
the fraction of slice #3 that goes to Alice, so that Alice’s value is s(1− x) + tx
and Bob’s value is sx+ t(1− x). The social welfare as a function of x is:
F (x) = w
(
s(1− x) + tx)
)
+ w
(
sx+ t(1− x))
)
.
Since w is convex on [s, t], F (x) is also convex, so its maximum is attained
either at x = 0 or at x = 1. But F (0) = F (1) = w(s) + w(t), so both must
be maximum points. But, in these two maximum points, Alice and Bob receive
different values (Alice receives more when x = 1 and Bob receives more when
x = 0). Thus the absolute-w-maximizer is not ESV.
Proof of Theorem 4.3(c). Suppose w is not strictly-concave in [0, 1] and let [s, t]
be an interval in which it is convex, with 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1. Suppose also that the
relative-w-maximizer is proportional. Consider the following cake, which has to
be divided among k + 2 agents — Alice, Bob and the so called complementary
agents C1, . . . , Ck (where k is sufficiently large such that 2k < t− s):
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v̂A s 0 t− s− 2k 1− t+ 2k
v̂B 0 s t− s− 2k 1− t+ 2k
v̂C1 0 0 0 1
... 0 0 0 1
v̂Ck 0 0 0 1
By proportionality, each of the complementary agents must receive at least
1/(k+ 2) fraction of slice #4. Thus only a fraction 2k+2 of this slice remains for
Alice and Bob. Both Alice and Bob value the remnants of slice #4 as at most
2(1− t+ 2k )
k + 2
≤ 2
k + 2
<
2
k
.
Let us denote slice #3 and the remnants of slice #4 by H. Thus, both Alice
and Bob value H as t− s− ε, for some ε > 0.
Fix a division of slice #4 among the complementary agents. Let WC :=∑k
i=1 w(vCi(XCi)) be the contribution of the complementary agents to the total
welfare. Note that H is the only part of the remaining cake that both Alice and
Bob find valuable, moreover both of them evaluate H as t− s− . Let x ∈ [0, 1]
denote the proportion of H that is given to Alice. Then, the social welfare as a
function of x is:
F (x) = w
(
s+ x(t− s− ε))+ w(s+ (1− x)(t− s− ε))+WC .
Since w is convex on [s, t], F (x) is also convex, so the maximum is attained
either at x = 0 or at x = 1. But F (0) = F (1), so both must be maximum
points, implying that relative-w-maximizer is not ESV.
Remark. We do not know whether Theorem 4.3(c) holds without the propor-
tionality assumption, and whether it holds with a fixed number of agents.
4.2. Resource-monotonicity
In this section we prove that for absolute w-maximizers, weak concavity of
w is a necessary and sufficient condition for RM.
Theorem 4.5. The absolute-w-maximizer rule is resource-monotonic if and
only if w is concave.
Proof. Only if part: We assume that w is not concave and prove that the
absolute-w-maximizer is not RM. a By Lemma 4.4 there is an interval in which
w is strictly convex. Denote this interval by [s, s+2t], for some s ≥ 0 and t > 0.
Then, by convexity
w(s+ 2t)− w(s+ t) > w(s+ t)− w(s)
=⇒ w(s) + w(s+ 2t) > w(s+ t) + w(s+ t).
The continuity of w implies that there exists a small  > 0 such that:
w(s) + w(s+ 2t) > w(s+ t) + w(s+ t+ ). (1)
Consider the following cake:
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H
v̂A s 0 t+  0
v̂B 0 s t t
Initially the cake is made of only the three leftmost slices. By PO, Alice gets
the first slice and Bob gets the second slice. For any x ∈ [0, 1] let Y (x) be the
allocation where Alice gets the first slice and x fraction of the third slice. So
Alice’s absolute value is s+x · (t+ ) and Bob’s absolute value is s+(1−x) · (t).
The absolute welfare, as a function of x, is:
F (x) = Ŵw(Y (x)) = w(s+ x · (t+ )) + w(s+ (1− x) · t)
When x ∈ [0, 1], the arguments to w in the above expression are all in the
range [s, s + 2t] in which w is strictly convex. Hence, F (x) is strictly convex
in the interval [0, 1] so its maximum must be in one of the endpoints: F (0) =
w(s) + w(s + t) or F (1) = w(s + t + ) + w(s). Since w is increasing and
s + t +  > s + t, the maximum is attained at x = 1, so Alice gets all the slice
and her value is s+ t+ .
When the cake grows, PO dictates that the rightmost slice is given to Bob.
Again, for any x ∈ [0, 1] let Y (x) denote the allocation where Alice gets the first
slice and x fraction of the third slice. Now the absolute welfare is:
G(x) = Ŵw(Y (x)) = w(s+ x · (t+ )) + w(s+ t+ (1− x) · t)
the maximum in the range [0, 1] is either G(0) = w(s) + w(s + 2t) or G(1) =
w(s + t + ) + w(s + t). Inequality (1) implies that the former is larger so the
maximum is at x = 0, Alice gets nothing from the third slice and her value
drops to s. This proves that absolute-w-maximizer is not RM.
If part: we assume that w is concave and prove that the absolute-w-
maximizer is RM.
We start with upwards-RM. Let X be an allocation that maximizes the
welfare function Ŵw on the original cake C, and Y an allocation that maximizes
Ŵw on an enlarged cake C ∪ E. We use the following definitions:
• Agent i is unlucky if v̂i(Yi) < v̂i(Xi);
• Agent j is lucky if v̂j(Yj) > v̂j(Xj);
• Agent k is indifferent if v̂k(Yk) = v̂k(Xk).
• A pair of agents (i, j) is a bad pair if i is unlucky, j is lucky, and i has
conceded a positive slice to agent j, i.e, Xi ∩ Yj is positive.
If there are no unlucky agents in Y , then we are done — monotonicity is satisfied
for all agents.
Moreover, if there are no bad pairs in Y , then by giving all unlucky and
indifferent agents the original share that they had in X, the unlucky agents will
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be better-off and the other agents will not be harmed. Hence, if Y is welfare-
maximizing and has no bad pairs, then Y has no unlucky agents at all, and we
are done.
Therefore, to prove upwards-RM, it is sufficient to prove that there exists a
division Y ′ of C ∪E with Ŵw(Y ′) ≥ Ŵw(Y ) where there are no bad pairs. Let
(i, j) be a bad pair and let H := Xi ∩ Yj . By definition H is positive, so by PO
of X and Y it has a positive value for both i and j. Let z ∈ [0, 1] be a number
defined as:
z := min
(
v̂i(Xi)− v̂i(Yi)
v̂i(H)
,
v̂j(Yj)− v̂j(Xj)
v̂j(H)
, 1
)
A theorem of Stromquist and Woodall (1985) implies that there exists a subset
Hz ⊆ H such that:
v̂i(H
z) = z · v̂i(H) and v̂j(Hz) = z · v̂j(H)
By definition of z, Hz is sufficiently small such that:
v̂i(Yi ∪Hz) = v̂i(Yi) + z · v̂i(H) ≤ v̂i(Xi) (2)
v̂j(Yj \Hz) = v̂j(Yj)− z · v̂j(H) ≥ v̂j(Xj) (3)
both hold. That is, i does not become lucky by getting Hz and j does not
become unlucky by losing Hz (though one of them may become indifferent).
The concavity of w, together with the inequalities (2) and (3), imply the
following two inequalities:
w(v̂i(Yi ∪Hz))− w(v̂i(Yi)) ≥ w(v̂i(Xi))− w(v̂i(Xi \Hz)); (4)
w(v̂j(Yj))− w(v̂j(Yj \Hz)) ≤ w(v̂j(Xj ∪Hz))− w(v̂j(Xj)). (5)
By the optimality of X:
w(v̂i(Xi)) + w(v̂j(Xj)) ≥ w(v̂j(Xj ∪Hz)) + w(v̂i(Xi \Hz))
=⇒ w(v̂i(Xi))− w(v̂i(Xi \Hz)) ≥ w(v̂j(Xj ∪Hz))− w(v̂j(Xj)) (6)
Combining 6, 5 and 4 together yields
w(v̂i(Yi ∪Hz))− w(v̂i(Yi)) ≥ w(v̂j(Yj))− w(v̂j(Yj \Hz))
=⇒ w(v̂i(Yi ∪Hz)) + w(v̂j(Yj \Hz)) ≥ w(v̂j(Yj)) + w(v̂i(Yi))
So if we modify division Y by transferring Hz from j back to i, the welfare
weakly increases. Moreover, after the transfer, the pair (i, j) is no longer a bad
pair (either one of the agents becomes indifferent, or the conceded slice becomes
empty). Moreover, no new bad pairs are created by the transfer, since no agents
became lucky/unlucky. Therefore, we can remove the bad pairs one by one, until
we get a new division Y ′, which has at least the same welfare of Y but no bad
pairs. This implies that the absolute w-maximizer is upwards-RM.
For downwards-RM the proof is similar: here, Y is the old division (of the
larger cake) and X is the new division (of the smaller cake). Define a bad pair
as a pair (i, j) such that:
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• Agent i is lucky, i.e, v̂i(Xi) > v̂i(Yi);
• Agent j is unlucky, i.e, v̂j(Xj) < v̂j(Yj);
• Agent i has taken a positive slice from agent i, i.e, Xi ∩ Yj is positive.
If there are no lucky agents, then we are done. Moreover, if there are no bad
pairs, then the original division Y could be modified by giving all lucky and
indifferent agents the share they are going to receive in X (since the cake of
division Y contains the cake of division X). This makes the lucky agents better-
off and does not harm the unlucky agents. Hence, if Y is welfare-maximizing
and there are no bad pairs, then there must be no lucky agents at all, and we
are done. From here, the proof that there exists a division X ′ where there are
no bad pairs follows the above proof word by word.
Remark. A relation between concavity and resource-monotonicity in the con-
text of homogeneous goods is mentioned in Exercise 2.16 of Moulin (2004).
4.3. Population-monotonicity
In this section we prove that, for both absolute and relative w-maximizers,
weak concavity of w is sufficient for PM.
Theorem 4.6. If w is concave then absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer
are both population-monotonic.
Proof. When an agent joins or leaves, the total cake value does not change, so
the proof for absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer is the same.
The proof of downwards-PM is almost identical to the proof of upwards-RM
in the If Part of Theorem 4.5. The only difference is that here X is the original
division among the agents in N , and Y is the new division among the agents in
N ′ ( N . Similarly, the proof of upwards-PM is almost identical to the proof of
downwards-RM.
Note that ESV cannot be used to omit one of the upwards-PM or downwards-
PM arguments, since ESV is only guaranteed for strictly-concave functions (The-
orem 4.3) while Theorem 4.6 assumes merely concavity. We do not know if
concavity of w is necessary for PM.
4.4. Proportionality
In this section we prove that, for relative w-maximizers, hyper-concavity
(Definition 4.2) is sufficient for proportionality. The main theorem is:
Theorem 4.7. If the function w is hyper-concave, then the relative-w-maximizer
rule is proportional.
To prove this theorem we use several lemmata about the properties of
welfare-maximizing allocations. Although we need and prove them only for
relative-w-maximizers, we note that they hold for absolute-w-maximizers too.
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Lemma 4.8.
(a) Let X be an allocation that maximizes the relative social-welfare function
Ww. For every two agents i, j and for every slice H ⊆ Xj:
w′(vj(Xj)) · vj(H) ≥ w′(vi(Xi)) · vi(H)
(so H is given to an agent j for whom the product w′(vj(Xj))·vj(H) is maximal).
(b) Let X be an allocation that maximizes the absolute social-welfare function
Ŵw. For every two agents i, j and for every slice H ⊆ Xj:
w′(v̂j(Xj)) · v̂j(H) ≥ w′(v̂i(Xi)) · v̂i(H)
Proof. We prove part (a); the proof of (b) is entirely analogous.
We again use the theorem of Stromquist and Woodall (1985). For every H
and z ∈ [0, 1], there exists a subset Hz ⊆ H such that:
vi(H
z) = z · vi(H) and vj(Hz) = z · vj(H)
Let Y (z) be an allocation derived from X by taking Hz from agent j and giving
it to agent i. The difference of welfare between the two allocations, as a function
of z, is:
F (z) = Ww(Y (z))−Ww(X) =
= w
(
vi(Xi) + vi(H
z)
)
+ w
(
vj(Xj)− vj(Hz)
)
− w
(
vi(Xi)
)
− w
(
vj(Xj)
)
= w
(
vi(Xi) + z · vi(H)
)
+ w
(
vj(Xj)− z · vj(H)
)
− w
(
vi(Xi)
)
− w
(
vj(Xj)
)
Take the derivative as a function of z:
F ′(z) = w′
(
vi(Xi) + z · vi(H)
)
· vi(H)− w′
(
vj(Xj)− z · vj(H)
)
· vj(H)
When z = 0, the alternative allocation Y (z) is identical to the original allocation
X, and we know that this allocation maximizes Ww, so 0 is a maximum point
of F . Therefore, F ′(0) ≤ 0:
0 ≥ F ′(0) = w′
(
vi(Xi)
)
· vi(H)− w′
(
vj(Xj)
)
· vj(H)
=⇒ w′
(
vj(Xj)
)
· vj(H) ≥ w′
(
vi(Xi)
)
· vi(H).
We will now prove an interesting property of welfare-maximization with
hyper-concave functions: a poor agent never envies a richer agent. Formally,
given an allocation X, we say that:
• An agent i envies agent j, if vi(Xi) < vi(Xj). Note that values of the
same agent are compared.
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• An agent i is relatively/absolutely richer than agent j, if vi(Xi) > vj(Xj)
/ v̂i(Xi) > v̂j(Xj). Note that values of different agents are compared.
• An agent i is relatively/absolutely poorer than agent j, if vi(Xi) < vj(Xj)
/ v̂i(Xi) < v̂j(Xj).
Lemma 4.9. Let w be a hyper-concave function (xw′(x) is weakly-decreasing).
(a) If, in an allocation selected by the relative-w-maximizer rule, an agent i
envies an agent j, then agent i is relatively-richer than agent j.
(b) If, in an allocation selected by the absolute-w-maximizer rule, an agent
i envies an agent j, then agent i is absolutely-richer than agent j.
Proof. We prove part (a); the proof of (b) is entirely analogous. By Lemma 4.8
(taking H = Xj):
w′(vj(Xj)) · vj(Xj) ≥ w′(vi(Xi)) · vi(Xj)
Combining the latter inequality with the assumption that i envies j (vi(Xj) >
vi(Xi)) gives:
w′(vj(Xj)) · vj(Xj) > w′(vi(Xi)) · vi(Xi)
Since xw′(x) is weakly decreasing, this implies:
vj(Xj) < vi(Xi)
so i is relatively-richer than j.
Now we can prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. LetX be an allocation selected by the relative-w-maximizer
rule. We prove that X is proportional.
Call an agent i “unhappy” if vi(Xi) < 1/n. Suppose by contradiction that
X is not proportional. Then there is at least one unhappy agent, say i. By the
pigeonhole principle, i necessarily envies some other agent, say j. By Lemma
4.9, agent j must be relatively-poorer than i, so j is also unhappy. Now, consider
the set of all unhappy agents. Since each agent in the set envies another agent in
the set, there must be a cycle of agents envying each other. But this contradicts
the optimality of X. Hence, the set of unhappy agents must be empty.
Remark 4.10. We do not know if hyper-concavity is necessary for proportion-
ality. We do know that strict concavity is not sufficient for proportionality. For
example, for some constant p ∈ (0, 1), Let wp(x) = xp. Note that wp is strictly
concave but not hyper-concave. Consider the following cake:
v̂A 1 0
v̂B 2/3 1/3
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Let x ∈ [0, 1] be the value given to Alice. The value remaining for Bob is
1 − 2x/3. By proportionality, Bob must receive at least 1/2, so a proportional
rule must select x ≤ 3/4. The total relative (and absolute) welfare, as a function
of x, is given by:
F (x) = wp(x) + wp
(
1− 2x
3
)
=⇒ F ′(x) = w′p(x)−
2
3
w′p
(
1− 2x
3
)
=⇒ 3
4
F ′
(
3
4
)
=
3
4
w′p
(
3
4
)
− 1
2
w′p
(
1
2
)
The latter expression is positive since xw′p(x) is increasing. Hence F ′(3/4) > 0.
Since w′p is decreasing, F ′ is also decreasing, so F ′(x) > 0 for all x ≤ 3/4. Hence
F cannot have a maximum point at x ≤ 3/4, so the relative-w-maximizer rule
is not proportional.
4.5. The Nash-optimal rule
Let us collect our findings so far.
• The absolute-w-maximizer is RM and PM when w is concave, and ESV
when w is strictly-concave.
• The relative-w-maximizer is PM when w is concave, ESV when w is
strictly-concave, and PROP when w is hyper-concave.
Therefore, to get all desirable properties simultaneously, we have to find a rule
that is simultaneously maximizing the absolute and relative social welfare with
the same hyper-concave function w.
Indeed, such a rule exists. When w is a logarithmic function, absolute-w-
maximizer and relative-w-maximizer are both equivalent to the Nash-optimal
rule — the rule that maximizes the product of utilities (Nash, 1950):
XNash := arg max
X
n∏
i=1
v̂i(Xi) := arg max
X
n∏
i=1
vi(Xi)
Corollary 4.11. The Nash-optimal rule is ESV, RM, PM and PROP.
Is Nash-optimal the only welfare-maximizing rule with these four properties?
Below we prove that it is indeed unique.
Theorem 4.12. (a) If the absolute-w-maximizer is proportional, then it must
be the Nash-optimal rule.
(b) If the relative-w-maximizer rule is ESV, proportional and resource mono-
tonic, then it must be the Nash-optimal rule.
We start by proving uniqueness in the family of absolute welfare maximizers.
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Proof of Theorem 4.12(a). Consider the following one-slice cake:
v̂A 2a
v̂B 2b
A proportional allocation must give each agent exactly half the cake, so that
v̂A(XA) = v̂A(XB) = a and v̂B(XB) = v̂B(XA) = b.
Using Lemma 4.8 with j =Alice and H = XA and i =Bob gives:
w′(a) · a ≥ w′(b) · b
Using Lemma 4.8 with j =Bob and H = XB and i =Alice gives:
w′(b) · b ≥ w′(a) · a
Since a, b are general, this implies that:
∀a, b : aw′(a) = bw′(b)
This means that the function aw′(a) is a constant function (independent of a).
Hence, w must be a logarithmic function (w(·) = c ln (·) + d, for some constants
c > 0 and d) so absolute-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule.
We now turn to proving the uniqueness of the Nash-optimal rule in the
family of relative welfare-maximizers.
Proof of Theorem 4.12(b). By Theorem 4.3(c), if relative-w-maximizer is PROP
and ESV then w is strictly concave in [0, 1]. Hence our theorem follows from
the next lemma.
Lemma 4.13. If w is strictly concave in [0, 1] and the relative-w-maximizer
rule is proportional and resource-monotonic, then it is the Nash-optimal rule.
Proof sketch. We consider a cake that has to be divided among k + 2 agents
— Alice, Bob and the so called complementary agents C1, . . . , Ck. We assume
that k is large. One slice of the cake — the ’disputed slice’ — is wanted only by
Alice and Bob, and the main task of the relative-w-maximizer rule is to decide
how this slice is divided between them.
In the initial situation, the cake is small, and both Alice and Bob value
the entire cake as 1. Their value measures are similar, so a strictly concave
rule must give each of them exactly 1/2 of the disputed slice. Then the cake
grows. The enlargement is valuable only for Bob and for the complementary
agents, but not for Alice. When k is sufficiently large, the complementary agents
take all the enlargement, so Bob gains no value from it; the only effect of the
enlargement is that Bob’s value for the entire cake is larger, so Bob’s relative
value for the disputed slice is smaller. This breaks the symmetry and causes
the relative-w-maximizer rule to give either Alice or Bob a smaller share of the
disputed slice — in contradiction to resource-monotonicity. The only case in
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which this does not happen is when w is a logarithmic function, which implies
that relative-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule.
All the above has to be done twice: once to prove that w(x) is logarithmic
when x ∈ [0, 1/2], and then to prove that it is logarithmic when x ∈ [1/2, 1].
Proof. In the following cakes, the valuations are parameterized by s and t.
Cake 1 has the following valuations, for 0 < s < t < 1 and t ≥ 1/2:
H
v̂A 2− 2t 2t− 1 0 0 0
v̂B 2− 2t 0 2t− 1 0 t/s− 1
v̂C1 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
... 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
v̂Ck 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
Initially the cake contains only the four leftmost slices. Alice gets slice #2
and Bob gets slice #3. By strict concavity, slice #1 is divided equally between
Alice and Bob, and their value (relative and absolute alike) is t.
When the cake grows, the cake value increases from 1 to t/s for Bob and
for the complementary agents. Let Y be the new allocation. The relative value
of Bob is now at least (2t − 1)/(t/s). In contrast, the complementary agents
have to share a relative value of 1, so there is at least one agent for whom:
vCi(YCi) ≤ 1/k. Therefore, when k is sufficiently large:
vB(YB) > vCi(YCi) (7)
We claim that, for such k, Bob does not receive any value from the enlargement.
Indeed, suppose by contradiction that Bob receives from the enlargement a slice
H with positive value. Since H ⊆ YB , by Lemma 4.8:
w′(vB(YB)) · vB(H) ≥ w′(vCi(YCi)) · vCi(H)
Since H is a subset of the enlargement, vB(H) = vCi(H), and by assumption
this value is positive, so the above implies:
w′(vB(YB)) ≥ w′(vCi(YCi))
But this combined with (7) contradicts the strict concavity of w.
Since — for sufficiently large k — Bob does not receive anything from the
enlargement, by resource-monotonicity he must receive at least half of slice #1.
The same is true for Alice, so both of them must receive exactly half of slice #1.
Thus each of them has an absolute value of exactly t, so their relative values
are:
vA(YA) = t/1 = t and vB(YB) = t/(t/s) = s
Apply Lemma 4.8 with j =Alice, i =Bob and H =Alice’s share of slice #1:
w′(t) · (1− t) ≥ w′(s) · 1− t
t/s
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Apply Lemma 4.8 with j =Bob, i =Alice and H =Bob’s share of slice #1:
w′(s) · 1− t
t/s
≥ w′(t) · (1− t)
Combine these two inequalities to obtain tw′(t) = sw′(s), for any t ≥ 1/2.
Formally,
∀t ≥ 1/2 : ∀s with 0 < s < t < 1 : tw′(t) = sw′(s) (8)
Cake 2 has the following valuations, for 0 < s < t < 1 and t ≤ 1/2:
H
v̂A 2t 0 1− 2t 0 0
v̂B 2t 0 1− 2t 0 t/s− 1
v̂C1 0 2t 1− 2t 0 0
... 0 2t 1− 2t 0 0
v̂Ck 0 2t 1− 2t 0 0
v̂Ck+1 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
... 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
v̂C2k 0 0 0 1 t/s− 1
Initially the cake contains only the four leftmost slices. By strict concavity
Alice and Bob divide the slices valuable to both of them equally, so each of
them receives at least t.
When the cake grows, Bob’s total cake value as well as the second k-set of
complementary agent’s cake value increases from 1 to t/s. By the same reasoning
as in case of Cake 1, Bob does not receive anything from the enlargement, and
neither Alice nor Bob receive anything from slice #3. By resource-monotonicity,
Alice and Bob should have an absolute value of at least t, so they must split
slice #1 equally, giving each of them an absolute value of exactly t. Hence,
vA(YA) = t and vB(YB) = t/(t/s) = s. From here, the proof is the same as in
the previous case, and we get:
∀t ≤ 1/2 : ∀s with 0 < s < t < 1 : tw′(t) = sw′(s) (9)
The equations (8) and (9) together imply that the function tw′(t) must be
the constant function for all t ∈ (0, 1). This implies that w is a logarithmic
function, hence the relative-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule.
Remark 4.14. The example in Lemma 4.13 involves a possibly unbounded
number of agents. This raises the following open question: what division rules
are PROP and RM when the number of agents is bounded by some constant?
From the two parts of Theorem 4.12, we get:
Corollary 4.15. In the family of welfare-maximizers, the Nash-optimal rule is
the only essentially-single-valued rule that is both PROP and RM.
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4.6. Summary of division-rule properties
To summarize the properties of division rules proved in this section, Table
1 presents the properties that are satisfied by welfare-maximizing rules from a
well-studied one-parametric family (Moulin, 2004, chapter 3):
wp(x) = x
p/p when p 6= 0
wp(x) = ln(x) when p = 0
Axiom absolute-wp-maximizer relative-wp-maximizer
PO All All
ESV p < 1 (strictly concave) p < 1 (strictly concave)
PROP p = 0 (Nash) p ≤ 0 (hyper-concave)
RM p ≤ 1 (concave) p = 0 (Nash)
PM p ≤ 1 (concave) p ≤ 1 (concave)
Table 1: Sufficient conditions for the parameterized welfare-maximizing rules.
4.7. Computing Nash-optimal allocations
The nice properties of the Nash-optimal rule motivate us to search for algo-
rithms for finding the Nash-optimal division. We are not aware of an algorithm
for finding an exact Nash-optimal division in the general case8. However, Aziz
and Ye (2014) present an algorithm that finds a Nash-optimal division when
all agents have piecewise-constant valuations.9 The algorithm is called MEA
(Market Equilibrium Algorithm) and it is based on a connection between the
Nash-optimal rule and a well-known division rule called competitive-equilibrium-
from-equal-incomes.
In the following section we prove such connection for general valuations (not
only piecewise-constant). This will imply that any future algorithm developed
for one of the rules will work for the other rule as well.
5. Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
5.1. CEEI rules in cake-cutting
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) is a well-known rule
for fair and efficient allocation of homogeneous goods. It was first introduced
into the cake-cutting world by Weller (1985). We denote Weller’s definition by
WCEEI (weak CEEI); the reason will become clear later.
8 There are several algorithms for calculating or approximating the Nash-optimal welfare
in markets with divisible goods (Cole et al., 2013; Brânzei et al., 2017) or indivisible goods
(Caragiannis et al., 2016)
9 Their algorithm is based on earlier algorithms for finding equilibrium allocations in mar-
kets of homogeneous divisible goods, which are equivalent to piecewise-homogeneous cakes.
See Vazirani (2007); Jain and Vazirani (2010).
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Definition 5.1. Let C be a cake and X an allocation of the cake. Let P be
a nonatomic measure on C (called the "price measure"). We say that the pair
(X,P ) is a Weak Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (WCEEI) if it
satisfies the following conditions:
• WCE: For all i ∈ N and Z ⊂ C, P (Z) ≤ P (Xi) implies vi(Z) ≤ vi(Xi).
• EI: For all i ∈ N : P (Xi) = 1.
Note that it does not matter whether absolute or relative values are used in
this definition, since only values of the same agent are compared.
Weller (1985) proved that a WCEEI cake-allocation always exists. Moreover,
a WCEEI allocation has several nice properties.
Lemma 5.2 (Weller (1985)). Every WCEEI allocation is envy-free (hence also
proportional).
Proof. WCE implies that each agent i prefers his piece Xi over all pieces he
can afford. EI implies that all agents have the same set of affordable pieces.
Together they imply envy-freeness.
Lemma 5.3. Every WCE allocation is weakly-Pareto-optimal, i.e, no other
allocation is strictly better for all agents.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (X,P ) satisfies the WCE condition but
there exists an allocation Y which is strictly better than X for all agents: ∀i :
vi(Yi) > vi(Xi). The WCE condition implies that no agent i can afford the
piece Yi: ∀i : P (Yi) > P (Xi). Summing over all pieces gives
∑n
i=1 P (Yi) >∑n
i=1 P (Xi). But this is impossible since both sides equal P (C).
Interestingly, the WCEEI rule is not Pareto-optimal. 10.
Example 5.4. Consider the following cake.
v̂A 30 0 0
v̂B 0 10 20
Price 0.2 0.8 1
The two leftmost slices go to Alice. She pays 1 and gets all her value, so the
WCEEI conditions are satisfied for her. The rightmost slice goes to Bob. He
pays 1 and cannot get any better deal for the same price: if he sells a fraction
x of his slice, then he loses a value of 20x and gains x money. With x money
he can only buy x/0.8 = 1.25x of the middle slice, which gives him only 12.5x
value. So the WCEEI conditions are satisfied for Bob too. However, it is clear
that the allocation is not PO since it can be Pareto-improved by giving the
middle slice to Bob.
10 Note that Weller’s definition of Pareto-optimality (before his Theorem 1) actually defines
weak-Pareto-optimality. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
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Pareto-optimality can be restored by adding a requirement that, when an
agent is indifferent between several best slices, he gets the cheapest of these
slices. We call the strengthened condition Parsimonious Competitive Equilib-
rium (PCE).11 It requires that for all i ∈ N and Z ⊂ C:
• P (Z) ≤ P (Xi) implies vi(Z) ≤ vi(Xi) (the WCE condition), and:
• P (Z) < P (Xi) implies vi(Z) < vi(Xi).
Lemma 5.5. Every PCE allocation is Pareto-optimal.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (X,P ) satisfies the PCE condition but
there exists an allocation Y which is weakly better for all agents i and strictly
better for at least one agent j. Then, the PCE conditions imply that ∀i : P (Yi) ≥
P (Xi) and P (Yj) > P (Xj). Summing over all pieces gives
∑n
i=1 P (Yi) >∑n
i=1 P (Xi). But this is impossible since both sides equal P (C).
However, the PCEEI allocation is still not essentially-single-valued.
Example 5.6. Consider the following cake.
v̂A 30 1 0
v̂B 0 10 20
P1 0.2 0.8 1
P2 1 0.8 0.2
Consider the following two allocations: (1) Alice gets the two leftmost slices and
Bob gets the rightmost slice and the price is P1, or (2) Alice gets the leftmost
slice and Bob gets the two rightmost slices and the price is P2. Both of them
are PCEEI but the agents’ valuations are different.
We now define an even stronger condition which we call SCEEI. It is adapted
from Reijnierse and Potters (1998).
Definition 5.7. Let X be a cake-allocation and P be a measure on C. The
pair (X,P ) is a strong CEEI (SCEEI ) if it satisfies the following conditions:
• P (Z) > 0 iff Z is a positive slice (= valued positively by at least one
agent).
• SCE: For every agent i and positive-slice Z ⊆ C and positive-slice Zi ⊆ Xi:
vi(Zi)/P (Zi) ≥ vi(Z)/P (Z). In words, each agent buys only slices that
maximize his value-per-price ratio.
• EI: For every agent i: P (Xi) = 1.
The following lemma justifies the term SCEEI:
11 The condition was introduced by Mas-Colell (1992) and termed “parsimony” by Bogo-
molnaia et al. (2017).
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Lemma 5.8. Every SCEEI is a PCEEI (hence also PO, EF and PROP).
Proof. Since the EI condition is the same in all equilibrium variants, it is suffi-
cient to prove the PCE conditions for every agent i.
The EI condition implies that P (Xi) > 0, so Xi is a positive slice. Setting
Zi := Xi in the SCE condition implies that, for every positive slice Z:
vi(Z)/P (Z) ≤ vi(Xi)/P (Xi)
Hence, for every positive slice Z:
• P (Z) ≤ P (Xi) implies vi(Z) ≤ vi(Xi) (the WCE condition).
• P (Z) < P (Xi) implies vi(Z) < vi(Xi) (the extra PCE condition).
5.2. Properties of the the Strong CEEI rule
In this subsection we prove that the SCEEI rule has many nice properties:
in addition to being PO and EF, it is also ESV, RM and PM. We will use a
measure V , defined as the sum of all agents’ value-measures:
V (Z) :=
∑
i∈N
vi(Z)
Let (X,P ) be a SCEEI. By definition, P (Z) > 0 iff vi(Z) > 0 for at least one i,
which holds iff V (Z) > 0. Therefore, P is absolutely-continuous w.r.t. V . By
the Radon-Nikodym theorem, there exists a price-density function p, such that
for every slice Z ⊆ C:
P (Z) =
∫
x∈Z
p(x)dV
Let (Y,Q) be a SCEEI on an enlarged cake C ∪ E, and let q be the price-
density of Q, such that for every slice Z ⊆ C ∪ E:
Q(Z) =
∫
x∈Z
q(x)dV
Define the following subset of the original cake C, which contains all those
parts of C that are more expensive in equilibrium Y than in equilibrium X:
C∗ = {x ∈ C | q(x) > p(x)}
For every positive-slice Z∗ ⊆ C∗: Q(Z∗) > P (Z∗). By definition, for every
x ∈ (C \C∗), q(x) ≤ p(x). Thus, for every slice Z ′ ⊆ (C \C∗): Q(Z ′) ≤ P (Z ′).
Lemma 5.9. If in equilibrium Y agent i holds a positive subset of C∗ (i.e.
Yi ∩ C∗ is a positive-slice), then in equilibrium X agent i holds almost only
subsets of C∗ (Xi ∩ (C \ C∗) is not a positive-slice).
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Proof. Define Z∗i = Yi ∩ C∗. By assumption it is a positive slice. Because
Z∗i ⊆ Yi, the SCE condition of equilibrium Y implies that for every positive-
slice Z ′ ⊆ C \ C∗:
vi(Z
∗
i )/Q(Z
∗
i ) ≥ vi(Z ′)/Q(Z ′)
Because Z∗i ⊆ C∗ and Z ′ ⊆ C \ C∗, the definition of C∗ implies that the old
price of Z∗i was lower than the new price and the old price of Z ′ was weakly
higher than the new price. Hence,
vi(Z
∗
i )/P (Z
∗
i ) > vi(Z
′)/P (Z ′)
Now the SCE condition of equilibrium X implies that Z ′ is not contained in Xi.
The above is true for every Z ′ which is a positive slice of C \ C∗; hence,
Xi ∩ (C \ C∗) cannot be a positive slice.
The following lemma says that, when the cake grows, the equilibrium price
of the old cake does not increase.
Lemma 5.10. Let (X,P ) be a SCEEI on the cake C and (Y,Q) a SCEEI on
an enlarged cake C ∪ E. Then, for every subset of the original cake Z ⊆ C:
Q(Z) ≤ P (Z).
Proof. Suppose there are exactly k agents that hold a positive slice of C∗ in
equilibrium Y . Their total income is k and they can afford all of C∗, so:
k ≥ Q(C∗)
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.9, in Equilibrium X these k agents spend their
entire income on C∗, so:
k ≤ P (C∗)
Combining these two inequalities gives:
P (C∗) ≥ Q(C∗)
But, for every positive-slice Z∗ ⊆ C∗, Q(Z∗) > P (Z∗). We conclude that C∗
cannot be a positive slice, i.e, V (C∗) = 0. Hence, q(x) ≤ p(x) almost everywhere
(w.r.t. V ). This implies the lemma.
Corollary 5.11. Let (X,P ) and (Y,Q) be two SCEEIs on the same cake C.
Then for all Z ⊆ C: Q(Z) = P (Z).
Proof. Apply Lemma 5.10 twice with E = ∅: once to prove that Q(Z) ≤ P (Z)
and another time to prove that Q(Z) ≥ P (Z) for all Z ⊆ C.
Define the SCEEI division rule as the rule that selects all allocations X for
which (X,PX) is a SCEEI.
Corollary 5.12. The SCEEI division rule is essentially-single-valued.
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Proof. By Corollary 5.11, every SCEEI on the same cake has the same price-
measure P . Hence, every SCEEI has the same budget set (the subsets Z ⊆ C for
which P (Z) = 1 are the same in every SCEEI). In every SCE, all agents attain
the maximum utility in their budget sets, which is the same in all SCEEIs.
Remark 5.13. Gale (1976) proved that, in any exchange economy with a finite
number of goods and linear utilities, the SCEEI rule is essentially-single-valued.
Gale’s result can be seen as a special case of our Corollary 5.12, since Gale’s
economy is equivalent to cake-cutting when the cake is piecewise-homogeneous
(each homogeneous region in such a cake represents a commodity in Gale’s
economy).
Corollary 5.14. The SCEEI division rule is resource-monotonic.
Proof. Suppose a cake C is enlarged, let C ∪ E be the enlarged cake and let
(X,P ), (Y,Q) be the equilibria on C and C ∪E, respectively. By Lemma 5.10,
the prices on the original cake C in the new price system (Q) are weakly lower
than in the old price system (P ). Hence, the budget set under Q contains the
budget set under P . Hence, in the new equilibrium Y , all agents can afford
the pieces that they had in equilibrium X. In every SCE, all agents attain the
maximum utility in their budget sets, which is weakly larger in Y than in X.
Corollary 5.15. The SCEEI division rule is population-monotonic.
Proof. Let(X,P ) be a SCEEI allocation. Suppose an agent i leaves and aban-
dons his share Xi. The pair (X,P ) still satisfies the SCE and EI conditions
on the cake C \Xi, so it is still a SCEEI allocation. Now, apply the resource-
monotonicity (Corollary 5.14) with E = Xi.
Remark 5.16. The CEEI rule was one of the first examples of a division rule
which is not resource-monotonic (Aumann and Peleg, 1974) and not population-
monotonic (Chichilnisky and Thomson, 1987). However, as noted later by
Moulin and Thomson (1988), the examples use complementary products, while
the standard cake-cutting model (without connectivity) assumes no complemen-
tarities between different parts of the cake.
5.3. SCEEI and Nash-optimal are the same rule
We saw two rules that are ESV, RM, PM, PO and PROP: the Nash-optimal
rule and the SCEEI rule. In this section we prove that they are equivalent —
they always select the same allocations.
Theorem 5.17. (a) If X is a Nash-optimal allocation, then there exists a price-
measure PX such that (X,PX) is a SCEEI.
(b) If (X,P ) is a SCEEI, then the allocation X is Nash-optimal.
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Proof of part (a). Given a Nash-optimal allocationX, we define the price-measure
PX in the following way:12
∀i : ∀Zi ⊆ Xi : PX(Zi) = vi(Zi)
vi(Xi)
The value of PX for slices that intersect more than oneXi is uniquely determined
by additivity, i.e:
∀Z ⊆ C : PX(Z) =
∑
i∈N
PX(Z ∩Xi) =
∑
i∈N
vi(Z ∩Xi)
vi(Xi)
Since proportional allocations exist, the maximum Nash welfare is necessarily
positive. Hence, all agents have a strictly positive value in X (vi(Xi) > 0 for all
i), so PX is well-defined. We now prove that (X,PX) satisfy each of the three
conditions in the definition of SCEEI.
First, we have to prove that PX(Z) > 0 iff Z is a positive-slice, i.e, has a
positive value for at least one agent.
If PX(Z) > 0 then for at least one agent i, PX(Z ∩Xi) > 0. By definition
of PX , PX(Z ∩Xi) = vi(Z∩Xi)vi(Xi) . Hence vi(Z ∩Xi) > 0 so Z is indeed a positive
slice.
Conversely, if PX(Z) = 0 then for all i, PX(Z ∩Xi) = 0. So by definition of
PX , vi(Z∩Xi) = 0, i.e, Z∩Xi is worthless for agent i. But then Z∩Xi must be
worthless for all agents — otherwise we could strictly increase the Nash welfare
by giving Z ∩Xi to an agent j 6= i who values it positively. The same is true
for every i. Therefore, Z is worth 0 for all agents, so it is indeed not a positive
slice.
The EI condition is satisfied since by definition PX(Xi) = vi(Xi)/vi(Xi) = 1.
It remains to prove the SCE condition. We fix an agent i, a positive slice Zi ⊆
Xi, and a positive slice Z ⊂ C. We show that vi(Zi)/PX(Zi) ≥ vi(Z)/PX(Z).
The slice Z can be written as a disjoint union of n slices: Z = ∪nj=1Zj , such
that for every j, Zj = Z ∩Xj . By Lemma 4.8, for every j:
w′(vj(Xj)) · vj(Zj) ≥ w′(vi(Xi)) · vi(Zj)
where the function w is a logarithmic function, e.g. w(x) = ln(x). Therefore,
w′(x) = 1/x and we get:
vj(Zj)
vj(Xj)
≥ vi(Zj)
vi(Xi)
By definition of the standard price-measure, the left-hand side equals PX(Zj).
Hence:
vi(Xi) · PX(Zj) ≥ vi(Zj)
12 Weller (1985) uses a similar price-measure in his proof, but does not consider Nash-
optimal allocations.
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Summing the latter inequality for j = 1, . . . , n gives:
vi(Xi) ·
n∑
j=1
PX(Zj) ≥
n∑
j=1
vi(Zj) =⇒ vi(Xi) · PX
( n⋃
j=1
Zj
)
≥ vi
( n⋃
j=1
Zj
)
=⇒
vi(Xi) · PX(Z) ≥ vi(Z) =⇒ vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Z)/PX(Z)
By definition of PX , for every Zi ⊆ Xi:
vi(Zi)/PX(Zi) = vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Z)/PX(Z)
so the SCE condition holds.
Proof of part (b). Let (X,P ) be a SCEEI and let Y be a Nash-optimal alloca-
tion. By part (a), the pair (Y, PY ) is SCEEI. By Corollary 5.12, the SCEEI rule
is essentially-single-valued. Hence, all agents have in X exactly the same values
that they have in Y . Therefore, X is Nash-optimal too.
As a corollary, we learn that a SCEEI allocation always exists. Moreover, we
get an alternative proof to the theorem of Weller (1985). 13
Theorem 5.18. A Pareto-optimal envy-free cake-allocation always exists.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, there exists a Nash-optimal allocation, X.
Since X maximizes an increasing welfare function, it is Pareto-optimal.
By Theorem 5.17(a), (X,PX) is a SCEEI.
By Lemma 5.8, (X,PX) is also a WCEEI.
By Lemma 5.2, X is envy-free.
To conclude: we saw three different division rules based on competitive equi-
librium. From weak to strong they are: WCEEI, PCEEI and SCEEI. All three
are envy-free and weakly-Pareto-optimal. The latter two are Pareto-optimal.
Only the latter one is ESV and Nash-optimal.
5.4. CEEI with homogeneous commodities
At this point we would like to clarify a potential confusion regarding the
relation of our results to the CEEI rule for homogeneous divisible commodities.
Suppose there is a finite set A of commodities. The bundle of an agent i is
represented by a vector Xi ∈ RA+, where for every commodity a ∈ A, Xi,a
denotes the amount of commodity a in the bundle. The common definition of
CE in this domain is (see e.g. Mas-Colell (1992), Bogomolnaia et al. (2017)),
for all i ∈ N and Z ∈ RA+:
• P · Z ≤ P ·Xi implies vi(Z) ≤ vi(Xi),
13 Alternative proofs can also be found in Reijnierse and Potters (1998) and Barbanel (2005).
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where P is the price-vector.
At first glance, the CE condition looks similar to the WCE condition (Def-
inition 5.1). However, it is well known that with homogeneous commodities
CEEI is equivalent to the Nash-optimal rule (e.g. Eisenberg and Gale (1959)
and Vazirani (2007)) while in our case, equivalence with the Nash-optimal rule
only obtains for SCEEI. In fact, in Example 5.6, the allocation giving the middle
slice to Alice is PCEEI (hence also WCEEI) but not Nash-optimal!
This apparent contradiction is resolved by noting a subtle difference between
the definitions of CE and WCE.14 The CE condition applies to all non-negative
bundles Z ∈ RA+. In contrast, the WCE condition applies only to slices Z that
are contained in the cake C; this is equivalent to requiring that the bundle Z
(the demand of an agent) is restricted to be below the social endowment, i.e.,
cannot exceed the amount of commodities in the economy. Thus CE is stronger
than WCE. In fact, here is a quick proof that CE is equivalent to SCE:
CE =⇒ SCE: Suppose by contradiction that SCE is violated for agent i.
This means that there is some commodity a with Pa > 0 and Xi,a > 0 (agent i
holds a positive amount of a), and another commodity b with Pb > 0, such that
vi(a)/Pa < vi(b)/Pb. Then we can create an alternative bundle Z (which may
be larger than the endowment) by replacing all units of a with Xi,a ·Pa/Pb units
of b. Then Z costs the same as Xi but is worth more for agent i, contradicting
the CE condition.
SCE =⇒ CE: Suppose by contradiction that CE is violated for agent i.
This means that there is a bundle Z with P · Z ≤ P ·Xi and vi(Z) > vi(Xi).
But then vi(Z)/(P ·Z) > vi(Xi)/(P ·Xi), contradicting the SCE condition.
6. The Leximin-optimal rules
The leximin-optimal division rules are based on the principle of equality
of welfare. Intuitively these rules work as follows. First we narrow down the
solution set to divisions that maximize the utility of the poorest agent. Then
among those solutions that satisfy this criterion, we select those which maximize
the utility of the second poorest agent. We repeat this process with the third,
fourth, etc. poorest agent.
To formally define the leximin rule we first define lexicographical ordering of
real vectors. We say that vector y ∈ Rn is lexicographically greater than x ∈ Rn
(denoted by x ≺ y) if x 6= y and there exists a number 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that
xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj .
Definition 6.1. (a) For a cake division X, define the relative-leximin-welfare
vector as a vector of length n which contains the relative values of the agents
under division X in a non-decreasing order.
14 We are grateful to Fedor Sandomirskiy and an anonymous referee for their help in clari-
fying this issue.
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(b) A cake division Y is said to be relative-leximin-better than X if the
relative-leximin-welfare vector of Y is lexicographically greater than the relative-
leximin-welfare vector of X.
(c) A cake division X is called relative-leximin-optimal if no other division
is relative-leximin-better than X.
(d) The relative-leximin division rule is the rule that returns all relative-
leximin-optimal divisions of the cake.
The terms absolute-leximin-welfare vector, absolute-leximin-better, absolute-
leximin-optimal and the absolute-leximin division rule are defined analogously.
Example 6.2. In the following cake, the absolute-leximin division rule splits
the leftmost slice between Alice and Bob, giving each of them 6. The rightmost
slice is given to Carl. Thus, the absolute-leximin-optimal vector is (6,6,9).
v̂A 12 0
v̂B 12 0
v̂C 21 9
The relative value vector of the above division is (6/12, 6/12, 9/30). The cor-
responding relative-leximin welfare vector is (9/30, 6/12, 6/12) = (3/10, 1/2, 1/2),
which is not optimal. The relative-leximin rule divides the leftmost slice between
all three agents, giving 1/6 to Carl (absolute value 3.5) and 5/12 to Alice and
Bob (absolute value 5). The rightmost slice is given to Carl. The relative-
leximin-optimal vector is (5/12, 5/12, 5/12).
Lexicographic optimization as a solution concept is used in various kinds
of fair division problems. It was advocated by the famous work of Rawls
(1971). Similar ideas appear in the bargaining solutions of Kalai and Smorodin-
sky (1975) and Kalai (1977). Moreover, it is a limit of an infinite sequence
of welfare-maximizing rules (Moulin, 2004, page 104). In division of homoge-
neous goods, this rule is known to be population-monotonic (e.g. (Moulin, 2004,
chapter 7)).
Dubins and Spanier (1961) were the first to study the leximin rule in a cake-
cutting setting. They prove that leximin-optimal cake divisions always exist.
The proof is based on the compactness of the space of value-matrices (which
we denoted by M in Lemma 4.1). The proof is equally valid for absolute and
relative leximin-optimal divisions. Hence, both the absolute- and the relative-
leximin division rules are well-defined. Moreover, these rules are both Pareto-
optimal since by definition, if a division Y Pareto-dominates a division X, then
both the absolute and the relative leximin-welfare vectors of Y are larger than
those of X.
Dall’Aglio (2001); Dall’Aglio and Hill (2003); Dall’Aglio and Di Luca (2014)
presented various properties and approximation algorithms for finding leximin
divisions (they call such divisions Dubins-Spanier-optimal). The goal of the
present section is to study the monotonicity properties of the leximin-optimal
rules.
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In Lemma 4.9 we proved that, in a hyper-concave welfare-maximizing allo-
cation, a poorer agent never envies a richer agent. In a leximin allocation, a
stronger lemma is true:
Lemma 6.3. For every absolute/relative-leximin-optimal division X, if agent
j is absolutely/relatively poorer than agent i then agent j believes that the piece
of agent i is worthless: v̂j(Xi) = vj(Xi) = 0.
Proof. If this were not the case, then we could take a small bit of Xi and give
it to agent j, thus achieving an absolute/relative-leximin-better division. But
this contradicts the leximin-optimality of X.
Corollary 6.4. If all agents assign a positive value to all positive slices, then
in any absolute/relative-leximin-optimal division, all agents have the same ab-
solute/relative value.
In Example 6.2, in case of the absolute-leximin-optimal division, Carl is
absolutely-richer than Alice and Bob, and indeed his share is worthless for both
of them.
Suppose X is an old division and Y is a new division of the same cake.
We say that an agent i conceded a slice to agent j if there is a positive slice
that belonged to agent i in X and belongs to agent j in Y (in other words,
Xi ∩ Yj has a positive value to at least one agent in N). If X and Y are
both absolute/relative-leximin-optimal, then by Pareto-optimality, Xi ∩ Yj has
positive value to both the agent who concedes the slice (i) and the recipient
(j). Hence, we have the following corollary of Lemma 6.3, which is true both
for relative- and absolute-values:
Corollary 6.5. Let X and Y be two leximin-optimal divisions. If, when switch-
ing from X to Y , agent i conceded a slice to agent j, then in division X, agent
i is weakly-poorer than j, and in division Y , agent i is weakly-richer than j.
Lemma 6.6. The absolute and the relative leximin division rules are essentially
single-valued.
Proof. The proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin rules, so
the adjectives are omitted.
Let X and Y be two different leximin-optimal divisions. We will prove that,
when switching from X to Y , there are no "lucky" agents (agents who gain
value) nor "unlucky" agents (agents who lose value).
Suppose by contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then, he must have con-
ceded a slice to at least one other agent, say j. By Corollary 6.5, i is weakly-
poorer than j in X and weakly-richer in Y . But this means that j is also
unlucky. So, all slices conceded by unlucky agents are held by other unlucky
agents. Suppose the unlucky agents take back all the slices that they conceded.
This has no effect on the lucky agents, but strictly increases the value of the
unlucky agents, since they now have at least the value that they had in X. But
this contradicts the optimality of Y . Hence, there are no unlucky agents. If Y
33
had a lucky agent without having any unlucky agent that would contradict the
optimality of X.
Since X and Y were arbitrary leximin-optimal divisions it follows that all
leximin-optimal divisions have the same value vector.
Lemma 6.7. The absolute- and relative-leximin division rules are population-
monotonic.
Proof. Again the proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin
rules. Thanks to Lemma 6.6 it is sufficient to prove downwards-PM.
Let X be a leximin-optimal division of C. Suppose that agent i leaves and
abandons his share Xi. So X is now a division of C \ Xi among the agents
N \ {i}. If Xi is divided arbitrarily among N \ {i}, the result is X+, a division
of C which is weakly leximin-better thanX. Let Y be a leximin-optimal division
of C among N \ {i}. Y is weakly leximin-better than X+ and hence weakly
leximin-better than X.
We are now going to prove that there are no unlucky agents in Y . Suppose
by contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then he must have conceded a slice
to an agent j, who must also be unlucky (as explained in Lemma 6.6). All
slices conceded by unlucky agents, are held by other unlucky agents. If those
took back all the slices that they conceded, then all of them would be strictly
better off while the lucky ones would remain unaffected. This contradicts the
optimality of Y . Hence there are no unlucky agents and PM is proved.
All our lemmata so far were true for both absolute-leximin and relative-
leximin rules. The following subsections show some differences between these
two rules.
6.1. Absolute-leximin: PM and RM but not PROP nor EF
Theorem 6.8. The absolute-leximin division rule is population-monotonic and
resource-monotonic.
Proof. PM was proved in Lemma 6.7. The proof of RM is essentially the same:
the enlargement can be treated as a piece that was acquired from an agent who
left the scene15.
Unfortunately, the absolute-leximin rule is not PROP (hence also not EF).
For instance, in Example 6.2, the absolute-leximin-optimal division gives Carl
a value of 9, which is only 310 of his total cake value.
15Note that this argument does not work for the relative-leximin division rule. It is possible
that the relative-leximin-optimal division of the enlarged cake is lexicographically smaller than
the relative-leximin-optimal division of the smaller cake, since the change in the total cake
values changes the order between the agents’ relative values.
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6.2. Relative-leximin: PM and PROP but not RM nor EF
Theorem 6.9. The relative-leximin division rule is proportional and population-
monotonic.
Proof. PM was proved in Lemma 6.7. PROP holds because proportional di-
visions exist. The relative-leximin-welfare of a proportional division is at least
(1/n, . . . , 1/n), hence the optimal relative-leximin-welfare vector must be at
least (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Example 6.10. The cake below shows that the relative-leximin rule is not RM.
H
v̂A 9 9 0 0 0 0
v̂B 9 9 0 0 0 0
v̂C 4 4 10 0 0 18
v̂D 4 4 0 10 0 18
v̂E 4 4 0 0 10 18
The largest value that can be given to both Alice and Bob is 9. Hence, in
the smaller cake, the optimal relative-leximin-welfare vector is
(9/18, 9/18, 10/18, 10/18, 10/18).
It is attained by halving the two leftmost slices between Alice and Bob, and
giving the three slices at their right to Carl, David and Eve, in that order.
In the larger cake, the largest value that can be given to Carl, David and
Eve from the additional slice at the right is 6. So the largest value that can
be given to them from the four rightmost slices is 16. However, the total cake
value has doubled for them. Hence, if Alice and Bob keep their share of 9, the
relative-leximin-welfare vector changes to (16/36, 16/36, 16/36, 9/18, 9/18).
Note that Alice and Bob are now relatively-richer than Carl, David and
Eve, and their pieces have a positive value for them. Thus, by Lemma 6.3, the
division in which Alice and Bob keep their current shares cannot be relative-
leximin-optimal.
Remark 6.11. (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2016) study the CEEI and leximin
rules for a finite number of divisible goods. For this case, they provide alterna-
tive proofs of non-monotonicity of relative-leximin and of resource-monotonicity
of CEEI.
Example 6.12. The cake below shows that the relative-leximin rule, while
PROP, is not EF.
v̂A 2/5 3/5 0
v̂B 0 1/3 2/3
v̂C1 0 0 1
v̂C2 0 0 1
v̂C3 0 0 1
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A C-agent can only get a share more than 1/3 if another C-agent gets less.
Similarly we cannot increase the share of Bob above 1/3 without harming the
C-agents, and cannot increase the share of Alice without harming Bob. Thus
the leximin-optimal vector is (1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
,
2
5
)
.
Alice envies Bob’s piece, therefore the leximin rules are not envy free.
Remark 6.13. Dall’Aglio and Hill (2003, Theorem 3.10) give a more compli-
cated proof of a stronger claim: they prove that the relative-leximin rule is not
EF even when all agents value all slices positively. This contradicts a claim that
Weller (1985) attributes to Dubins and Spanier (1961). The confusion probably
arose due to an ambiguity in the term “equitable”. Weller (1985) uses this term
to mean “envy-free”, while Dubins and Spanier (1961) use this term to mean
“all agents have the same relative value”. Indeed, Corollary 6.4 shows that a
relative-leximin allocation is equitable in the latter sense.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
We studied monotonicity properties in combination with classic fairness ax-
ioms of envy-freeness, proportionality and Pareto-optimality. We proved that
the Nash-optimal rule is a SCEEI. Furthermore we showed that the Nash-
optimal rule is the only essentially single valued rule in a large family of welfare
maximizing rules that is resource monotonic and proportional. Table 2 summa-
rizes the properties of the various division rules featured in this paper.
Rule ESV EF PROP PO RM PM
absolute-leximin Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
relative-leximin Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
absolute-utilitarian No No No Yes Yes Yes
relative-utilitarian No No No Yes No Yes
Nash-optimal/SCEEI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Properties of division rules presented in this paper.
The present paper opens up many interesting research questions.
• We proved the uniqueness of the Nash-optimal rule in the family of welfare-
maximizers. We believe that this family, in itself, can be character-
ized by adding axioms used in the cardinal-welfarism framework, such
as anonymity and separability (see chapter 3 of Moulin (2004)). We have
not done so since we wanted to keep the present paper focused on the
fairness axioms, but this is an interesting direction for future work.
• When dividing resources such as time or land, it may be important that
the pieces are connected. In an accompanying technical, we show that
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when the agents insist on receiving a connected piece, no proportional
and Pareto-optimal rule can be either resource-monotonic or population-
monotonic report (Sziklai and Segal-Halevi, 2015). If Pareto-optimality is
relaxed to weak-Pareto-optimality, then there exists a resource-monotonic
division procedure for two agents and a population-monotonic division
rule for n agents. It is an open question whether there exist proportional
resource-monotonic rules for three or more agents with the connectivity
constraint.
• Monotonicity properties may prevent some but not all possibilities of
strategic manipulation. In this paper we ignored strategic considerations
and assumed that all agents truthfully report their valuations. Indeed,
Brânzei and Miltersen (2015) show that, under mild technical conditions,
any deterministic truthful cake-cutting mechanism leaves one agent with
no cake at all, so truthfulness and fairness can be combined only by a ran-
domized mechanism. An interesting future research topic is how to ensure
monotonicity in such mechanisms. Recently, Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2016) discussed certain strategic properties of CEEI in the context of
homogeneous divisible goods16. It is reasonable to assume that these
properties transfer to the cake-cutting setting, but this requires further
work.
• Finally, there is the question of how to compute Nash-optimal allocations.
When the cake is piecewise homogeneous, the algorithm of Aziz and Ye
(2014) finds Nash-optimal allocations in polynomial time. It is unclear
how fast is their method exactly, but they use the primal-dual scheme
for convex programs developed by Devanur et al. (2008), which runs in
O(n4(log n+ n logU + logM)) time (where U is the maximal utility any
agent can achieve, and M is the total amount of money). It is a question
how Nash-optimal allocations can be found when the valuations are not
piecewise-constant.
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Appendix. Proof of Technical Lemma
Lemma 4.4. Let w be a twice-continuously-differentiable function.
1. If w is not strictly-concave in some interval [a, b] with a < b, then w is
convex in some sub-interval [s, t] with a ≤ s < t ≤ b.
2. If w is not concave in some interval [a, b] with a < b, then w is strictly-
convex in some sub-interval [s, t] with a ≤ s < t ≤ b.
Proof. We first prove statement 1.
If w is not strictly-concave in [a, b], then w′ is not strictly-decreasing in [a, b],
so w′′ is not strictly-negative in [a, b]. There are two cases:
Case #1: there exists a point where w′′ is positive: ∃x ∈ [a, b] : w′′(x) > 0.
By continuity of w′′, there exists an open interval around x where w′′ is positive.
In this interval w′ is increasing and w is convex.
Case #2: w′′ is always weakly-negative: ∀x ∈ [a, b] : w′′(x) ≤ 0. So the
function w′ is weakly-decreasing in [a, b]. But, since w′ is not strictly-decreasing
in [a, b], there exist some s, t with a ≤ s < t ≤ b such that w′(s) ≤ w′(t).
This means that, in the interval [s, t], the function w′ must be constant. In this
interval, w is linear, hence also convex.
The proof of the statement 2 is entirely analogous to Case #1 above.
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